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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has not been kind to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (the Rules). From the growth of summary judgment as a 
                                                     
* J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Central Washington University, 2001. I would 
like to thank Professor Brooke Coleman, whose expertise and passion for civil procedure is positive-
ly infectious, as well as Professor Sara Rankin, without whom this author’s writing would be a hazy 
shadow of what it is and might still yet become. Finally, but most emphatically, I thank my mother, 
Dr. Debbie Olson, Ph.D. She would insist that my accomplishments are the result of splendid parent-
ing, and I would be hard-pressed to disagree. 
 1. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks for 
Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_06-12-09. 
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mechanism to let judges instead of juries determine facts,2 to the  
love–hate relationship with class actions,3 judicial interpretations of the 
Rules have revealed a trend toward complicating the ability of plaintiffs 
to find redress for their claims.4 Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the shifting standards of pleading requirements under Rule 8. Much has 
been written by academics and practitioners alike regarding the ripples 
caused by Twombly and Iqbal.5 Although the Court would like to believe 
otherwise, would-be plaintiffs are faced with a greater pleading standard 
than the plain language of Rule 8 suggests. Now, a new victim of judicial 
misinterpretation has emerged: the Appendix of Forms under Rule 84. 
In its entirety, the Rules are designed with the overarching purpose 
of securing the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”6 Rule 84 and the accompanying Appendix of 
Forms were initially adopted in 1938 to illustrate the “simplicity and 
brevity . . . which the [R]ules contemplate.”7 In fact, the practice of 
providing sample forms can be traced back to the twelfth century English 
legal system wherein an aggrieved party petitioned for a writ from the 
Crown carefully tailored to the specific legal claim involved.8 Using the 
wrong writ led to a failure of the claim; thus, sample writs were compiled 
and provided for lawyers to use.9 
Although critics often debate whether the present-day forms were 
in fact relied upon by practitioners, their adoption served as a reflection 
of what the Rules are meant to be—a type of check and balance against 
                                                     
 2. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 395 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whether a person’s 
actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury. 
Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the 
four other judges to review the case unreasonable.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting prior case law 
referring to one component of class action suits as an “adventuresome innovation”); Eisen v. Carlisle 
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974) (quoting one case describing the litigation as a “Frankenstein 
monster posing as a class action”). 
 4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (finding fault with the majority’s use of what appears to be a Rule 
23(b)(3) test in a Rule 23(a) analysis); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that con-
clusory allegations unsupported by well-pleaded facts are disregarded under Rule 8); Harris, 550 
U.S. at 380–81 (holding that the court’s interpretation of the video tape was the only reasonable 
interpretation sufficient for summary judgment under Rule 56); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (finding a requirement of plausibility in Rule 8). 
 5. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. These cases are discussed in greater detail later 
in this Note. 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 7. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note (2015) (internal quotations omitted). 
 8. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function 3–4 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Re-
search, Working Paper No. 2014-44, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472083. 
 9. Id. at 4. 
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expansive judicial interpretation contrary to the liberal vision of the 
Rules.10 As an example of this, Rule 8 requires that a complaint need 
only a “short and plain statement” of jurisdiction, the claim entitling the 
pleader to relief, and a demand for the relief sought.11 Accompanying 
this rule, Form 11 illustrates a sample complaint for negligence, consist-
ing of a single paragraph covering jurisdiction followed by one line each 
for the claim and demand for relief.12 The theory went that a plaintiff 
who plainly modeled their complaint on Form 11 should survive a mo-
tion to dismiss.13 In contrast, the recent holdings of the Court now re-
quire consideration of whether the allegations of a claim are “plausi-
ble,”14 a sharp departure from the language of Rule 8 and the content of 
Form 11. 
The contradiction between the Rules and the interpretations arrived 
at by the Twombly and Iqbal courts, among other reasons, led the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules to recommend abrogating the entirety of 
Rule 84 and the Forms.15 Last year, the Supreme Court of the United 
States approved the recommendations and, with no intervention by Con-
gress, the forms died a quiet death this past December.16 This Note ex-
amines the drastic and unnecessary reaction by the Advisory Committee 
and recommends what would have been a more evenhanded approach to 
resolving the pleading juxtaposition created by the Court: amending only 
those forms affected by Twombly and Iqbal—to wit, Rule 8 and Forms 
10 through 21. It may be that the Advisory Committee cannot craft a 
sample complaint that would in all cases be sufficient under the Court’s 
interpretations, but that is precisely the point. It is an uncomfortable con-
versation that needs to happen: the Court changed the Rules in Twombly 
and Iqbal without going through the appropriate legislative process. Now 
the process has been used to sweep the mess under the rug. If the Advi-
sory Committee could not prepare a sufficient sample complaint, how 
can we expect plaintiffs to do so? 
                                                     
 10. Id. at 2. Professor Spencer states that the “principal function of the forms was to reify the 
liberal vision of the Federal Rules and to guard against deviations therefrom.” Id. 
 11. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 11. 
 13. See, e.g., García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 15. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
AGENDA BOOK FOR MAY 29–30, 2014, COMM. MEETING 412 (2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST2014-
05.pdf [hereinafter COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014]. 
 16. A full copy of the packet of amendments forwarded to Congress by the Supreme Court on 
April 29, 2015, may be found at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ 
frcv15%28update%29_1823.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinafter Amendments]. 
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Part I of this Note discusses the history of Twombly and Iqbal and 
their effect on pleading standards under the Rules. Part II describes how 
courts have struggled, unsuccessfully in many cases, to reconcile the 
Court’s interpretation with the language of Rule 8 and the illustrative 
forms under Rule 84. Part III outlines the response of the Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the dilemma created by 
Twombly and Iqbal. Finally, Part IV discusses the author’s alternative to 
abrogation of the Forms. 
I. THE RIPPLES OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
A. First Came Twombly . . . 
In 2007, the Supreme Court caused a shift in pleading requirements 
when it considered the antitrust case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.17 
The plaintiffs in the original action—representing subscribers to local 
telephone and internet services—sought to break up the monopolies held 
by various regional telecommunications corporations.18 The complaint 
alleged violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act19, which prohibits all con-
tracts in restraint of trade or commerce.20 As support for this allegation, 
the plaintiffs pointed to the behavior of the regional corporations includ-
ing: (1) parallel conduct in each region seemingly designed to stifle 
competition; (2) common failure to pursue attractive business opportuni-
ties when doing so would compete with another regional corporation; 
and (3) the statement by one regional chief executive officer noting that 
competition with another regional corporation did not seem right.21 
The district court originally dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, noting 
that an allegation of parallel business conduct, taken alone, did not suf-
fice for a claim under § 1.22 According to the district court, the plaintiffs 
were required to plead additional facts tending “to exclude independent 
self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel behav-
ior.”23 The court of appeals reversed, stating that the complaint had been 
tested under the wrong standard and that additional facts were unneces-
                                                     
 17. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544. 
 18. Id. at 550. 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).  
 20. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.  
 21. Id. at 550–51. 
 22. Id. at 552. 
 23. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated 425 F.3d 
99 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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sary.24 The ruling was appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri. 
The Court’s analysis appeared to be grounded in both the language 
of Rule 8 and what the requirements meant when taken with the ability to 
attack the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12. The Court began its 
analysis by considering Rule 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”25 
The purpose of this requirement, according to the Court, was to “give the 
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 
which it rests.”26 However, a complaint attacked under Rule 12(b)(6) 
strikes at the plaintiffs’ obligations to provide the “grounds” of their “en-
title[ment] to relief,” requiring more than mere labels, conclusions, or 
formulaic recitations of the elements.27 Notably, the Court quoted 
Rule 8(a) when it referred to the “grounds” of a complaint, yet that word 
appears only in Rule 8(a)(1) referring to the “grounds for the court’s ju-
risdiction,” not in Rule 8(a)(2) dealing with the “short and plain state-
ment that the pleader is entitled to relief.”28 Regardless, the Court deter-
mined that it need not accept as true those allegations not supported by 
factual allegations and that a plaintiff must plead enough facts such that 
the remaining allegations are “plausible” and “not merely consistent 
with” the allegations.29 
It is clear from the Court’s discussion that the “plausible” standard 
was meant to be narrow and uncontroversial. Because the issue in the 
case, as stated by the Court, was a determination of the “proper standard 
for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel con-
duct,” the new “plausible” pleading standard was meant only to apply to 
pleadings in those limited claims.30 Immediately after announcing the 
(new) standard, the Court attempted to clearly distinguish between the 
plausible standard required and a heightened pleading standard reaching 
probability.31 The Court even pointed out that well-pleaded complaints 
                                                     
 24. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
(holding that “plus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on paral-
lel conduct to survive dismissal”). 
 25. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 26. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 
 27. Id. (alteration in original) (citing generally Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
 29. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. 
 30. Id. at 553. 
 31. Id. at 556 (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probabil-
ity requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”). 
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under the “plausible” pleading standard may still go forward despite 
“savvy judge[s]” believing that proof of a plaintiff’s case is improbable.32 
Unfortunately, Rule 8 makes no distinction between antitrust cases 
and any other cause of action, and the Court did not make the narrow 
application explicit in its opinion. Thus, “plausibility” became the new 
standard for all civil pleadings going forward.33 
B. . . . Then Came Iqbal 
Nearly two years to the day after its decision in Twombly, the Court 
had occasion to again consider pleading standards in the case of Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal.34 The plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim, brought charges against a 
number of government officials, including former Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.35 In his 
complaint, Mr. Iqbal alleged that various institutional behaviors amount-
ed to a policy of systemic discrimination against Muslims in violation of 
the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.36 The defendants 
filed for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but their motion was denied.37 
On appeal, the appellate court applied the “plausibility” test as decided in 
Twombly, ultimately deciding that Mr. Iqbal’s claim did not require “am-
plification” with additional factual allegations.38 
The appellate court’s opinion, however, revealed a strained applica-
tion of the Twombly standard against the Rules. On one hand, the court 
expressed concern that federal government officials might be subjected 
to “inherently onerous discovery requests” by other plaintiffs regarding 
other national security programs and policies.39 On the other hand, the 
court seemed to stress that the Twombly test should not be applied as a 
heightened pleading standard, going so far as to quote the Supreme 
Court’s earlier proclamation that heightened pleading standards “must be 
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judi-
cial interpretation.”40 
                                                     
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (tort action involving violation of California’s wage and overtime laws); Marshall v. 
West, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (case involving a violation of civil rights arising 
out of a stop and search); Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Def. Supply Ctr. Phila., 489 F. Supp. 2d 
30, 35 (D.D.C. 2007) (case involving government contracts). 
 34. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 35. Id. at 666. 
 36. Id. at 669. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 39. Id. at 179. 
 40. Id. at 158 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)). 
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With these arguments in mind, the Supreme Court granted certiora-
ri. The Court began its analysis by restating the core tenants from 
Twombly: (1) that the court need not accept as true legal conclusions not 
supported by factual allegations; and (2) that only a complaint that states 
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.41 From this two-
pronged test, the Court in Iqbal distilled two “working principles”: (1) 
threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by “merely 
conclusory statements,” will not suffice; and (2) a court is required to 
draw on “its own judicial experience and common sense” when deter-
mining whether a complaint is plausible.42 Whether the Court was adding 
new components to the Twombly test or just explaining how judges 
should arrive at “plausibility,” the end result was the same: surviving a 
motion to dismiss became much harder. 
Academic commentators were swift to point out the paradoxical ef-
fect of Iqbal’s ruling when compared to the simple requirements of Rule 
8.43 The two-part test in Iqbal seemed to call upon language noticeably 
absent in the Rule itself44 while creating greater unpredictability for liti-
gants contrary to the “simplicity and brevity” envisioned under Rule 
84.45 Even Congress was spurred into action, introducing measures in 
both the House and Senate to rescind the Court’s decision.46 However, 
both measures stalled when the Judicial Conference of the United States 
asked Congress not to intercede so that the Rules Enabling Act process 
could sort through the issue.47 The Court’s analysis is made even more 
confusing when one considers that, just three weeks prior to its decision 
in Iqbal, the Court reviewed and approved changes to Form 11 (renum-
bered from Form 9).48 The changes to this basic complaint form for neg-
ligence actually provided fewer specifics than the prior version, raising 
the question: Would a complaint drafted pursuant to Form 11, as ap-
                                                     
 41. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the  
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery 
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Jeremiah J. McCarthy & Matthew D. Yusick, Twombly and Iqbal: Has the Court 
“Messed Up the Federal Rules?,” 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 121 (2011). 
 44. For example, the word “plausibility” is found nowhere within Rule 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 84.  
 46. See generally Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open 
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 47. Letter from James. C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the United States, to Rep. John 
Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 11, 2010); see Memorandum from the 
Admin. Office of the Courts to the Standing Comm. (May 18, 2010), available at 
https://www.hitpages.com/doc/6708666036125696/1. 
 48. McCarthy & Yusick, supra note 43, at 128. 
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proved by the Court, pass its minimal pleading standards outlined three 
weeks later in Iqbal?49 The answer to this question remains unclear. 
II. HARMONY OR DISCORD BETWEEN TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND RULE 84 
A. Pleading and Form 11 
In addition to scholarly critique, district and appellate courts have 
also struggled to reconcile the (new) test with the pleading requirements 
outlined in Rule 8 and illustrated by the Forms. In García–Catalán v. 
United States, the district court dismissed the complaint because it failed 
to state a “plausible” claim under Iqbal and Twombly, but the First Cir-
cuit reversed, specifically citing Form 11 and stating that the plaintiff had 
“plainly modeled” the complaint on the Form.50 In the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, the court more bluntly stated its position 
that a “pleading, motion, or other paper that follows one of the Official 
Forms cannot be successfully attacked.”51 Thus, to the extent that 
Twombly and Iqbal can be read to conflict with the Forms, at least some 
courts in the Federal Circuit believe that “the Forms control.”52 Several 
unpublished opinions have followed this line of reasoning, going so far 
as to openly resist the Twombly and Iqbal tests. In fact, one court in a 
surprising act of prescience stated as follows: “Absent an explicit abroga-
tion of these forms by the Supreme Court, this court presumes that they 
are ‘sufficient to withstand attack under the rules under which they are 
drawn’ and ‘practitioner[s] using them may rely on them to that ex-
tent.’”53 
B.  Patent Litigation 
Patent litigation in particular has served as a prime example of the 
Court’s fracture over how to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with 
                                                     
 49. Id. 
 50. García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 51. R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC, 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3162 (2d ed. 1997)). 
 52. R+L Carriers, Inc., 681 F.3d at 1334.  
 53. Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. Transcore, L.P., C.A. No. 09-418 GMS, 2009 WL 4828661, at *4 
(D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) (alteration in original) (“Iqbal did not squarely address the continued vitality 
of the pleading forms appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); see also Automated 
Transactions, LLC v. First Nigeria Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10–CV–00407(A)(M), 2010 WL 5819060, at 
*3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (“In my view, reconciling the dictates of Twombly and Iqbal with the 
Appendix Forms is not merely difficult, it is impossible. Whereas Iqbal decrees that ‘conclusions or 
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’ the Appendix Forms allege 
conclusions which fail to even mention the elements of a cause of action.”) (internal citation omit-
ted). 
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Rule 84.54 Although patent law is a notoriously tumultuous sea to navi-
gate, the pleading standards set forth in Form 18 were, like its counter-
part in Form 11, undeniably barebones.55 Courts have taken numerous 
different approaches to harmonizing Form 18 with the Twombly and Iq-
bal standards set forth by the Supreme Court. The end result was a lack 
of uniformity, frustrating practitioners and judges alike.56 
While some courts have drawn the line clearly that “the Forms con-
trol,” there is dissention and disagreement within the ranks as to the qual-
ity of that control.57 In R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC, the court 
indicated that providing fewer facts than what is laid out in Form 18 may 
be sufficient.58 Other defenders of Form 18 took a more conservative 
approach, noting that the Form offered guidance only for pleading direct 
patent infringement but no other types of infringement.59 Thus, a com-
plaint alleging indirect patent infringement (such as through inducement 
or contributory infringement) had to be analyzed under the lens of 
Twombly and Iqbal and not simply through the Forms themselves.60 Fi-
nally, some defenders of the Forms critiqued Form 18 for not addressing 
the complexities of patent infringement claims involving multiple or dif-
ferent types of products.61 
                                                     
 54. See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 2026627, 
at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 6, 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have not 
affected the adequacy of complying with Form 18. To hold otherwise would render Rule 84 and 
Form 18 invalid. This cannot be the case.”). 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 18. The Form requires only a statement of juris-
diction, an assertion of patent ownership, a simple claim of infringement, a certification that notice 
of the infringement was provided to the defendant, and a demand for relief. 
 56. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The court con-
cedes that “[i]t is not easy to reconcile Form 18 with the guidance of the Supreme Court in Twombly 
and Iqbal.” Id. at 905. The court goes on to imply that a pleading made under Form 11 (“outlining a 
three-paragraph complaint for negligence”) would survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal. 
Id. 
 57. R+L Carriers, Inc., 681 F.3d at 1334. Although Form 18 refers to the infringement of a 
specific “device,” the complaint may still survive a motion to dismiss if it provides “notice and facial 
plausibility” of the allegations, which is “not an extraordinarily high [bar].” See M. Andrew Holt-
man, C. Brandon Rash & Luke J. McCammon, Avoiding Dismissal in Patent Infringement Cases: An 
Update on the Twombly / Iqbal Pleading Standard, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10 (2014). 
 58. K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 
2013). 
 59. R+L Carriers, 681 F.3d at 1336; see also Halton Co. v. Streivor, Inc., No. C10-00655 
WHA, 2010 WL 2077203, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (“On its face, however, Form 18 is silent 
as to any theory of patent infringement besides direct infringement.”); Eolas Techs., Inc., 2010 WL 
2026627, at *3 (“Form 18 does not expressly address indirect infringement claims . . . .”); Gradient 
Enters., Inc. v. Skype Techs. S.A., 932 F. Supp. 2d 447 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (suggesting that Form 18 
applies to patent infringement cases, and not patent invalidity claims). 
 60. Holtman, Rash & McCammon, supra note 57, at 11. 
 61. See Stacy O. Stitham & David Swetnam-Burland, Fractious Form 18, 45 
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 5 (2012); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Intergraph Corp., No. C 03-2517 MJJ, 
2003 WL 23884794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2003) (“In light of these facts, Plaintiff’s claim must 
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The underlying question remains: did the Forms stand above 
Twombly and Iqbal in the hierarchy of authority, or did the Supreme 
Court manage to change the rules of the game without changing the 
Rules?62 Up until this year the answer was unclear, with courts taking 
positions all along the spectrum and then sniping at their colleagues for 
disagreeing. One Eastern District of Virginia court noted that “the 
threshold problem with [cases such as R+L Carriers] is that they accord 
no force to either the text or teaching of Twombly and Iqbal which re-
quire more to plead a legally sufficient claim than is set out in Form 
18.”63 However, one thing is certain: the lower courts made no effort to 
hide the direct collision between the Federal Rules and the decisions of 
Twombly and Iqbal. And now that the Forms have been tossed aside, this 
particular riddle will never be solved. 
III. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE 
Given the difficulties experienced by the lower court in applying 
the new pleading standard, the Advisory Committee considered a revi-
sion to the Rules to confront the issue. Under federal law, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure may be changed only pursuant to the Rules En-
abling Act.64 The Rules Enabling Act, very generally, requires delibera-
tion by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules followed by an oppor-
tunity for public comment on any proposed changes to the Rules.65 Any 
proposed changes must then be presented to the Supreme Court before 
finally giving Congress a chance to intervene prior to enactment.66 Be-
cause Twombly and Iqbal seemingly changed the Rules in violation of 
the Rules Enabling Act process—without public input or congressional 
oversight—the Advisory Committee ostensibly had a problem on its 
hands. 
Initially, the Advisory Committee held off on taking action, prefer-
ring instead to observe the effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions as 
they played out in the lower courts.67 In the meantime, Congress made 
                                                                                                                       
be read as follows: one or more of Defendant’s 4000-plus products directly infringes, contributorily 
infringes, or induces infringement of at least one claim in each of the patents-in-suit. Form [18] 
simply does not address a factual scenario of this sort.”). 
 62. See Holtman, Rash & McCammon, supra note 57. 
 63. Macronix Int’l, Co. v. Spansion Inc., No. 3:13-cv-679, 2014 WL 934505, at *6 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 10, 2014). 
 64. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (1988). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
MINUTES FOR OCT. 8–9, 2009, COMM. MEETING 8 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV10-2009-min.pdf [hereinafter COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009] 
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several attempts to repeal the Court’s holding in Twombly and Iqbal, but 
neither bill survived the Judicial Committee.68 In 2009, the Advisory 
Committee considered abrogation of Rule 84 and the Appendix of 
Forms, but no action was taken at that time.69 The Committee noted that 
“[abrogation] so soon would generate a perception that the Forms were 
being abrogated because the pleading forms, sufficient under notice 
pleading as it had been understood up to 2007, no longer suffice under 
Twombly and Iqbal.”70 The Committee found that to be “a serious reason 
to hold off,” for the time being, on complete abrogation.71 
The Advisory Committee revisited the Forms in 2011 when it again 
considered abrogation under the specter of the “debates engendered by 
Twombly and Iqbal.”72 While it found the Forms had been “important in 
1938” when the pleading philosophy was new, the Committee found that 
the Rules had now “matured.”73 The Committee further lamented the 
“great amounts of time” required in managing and updating the Forms 
and espoused a desire for some method in revising the Forms outside of 
the Enabling Act process.74 This comment on a speedier method of form 
revision was framed as being useful when “respond[ing] to changing cir-
cumstances.”75 Again, the implicit message was that cases such as 
Twombly and Iqbal did necessitate an update of the Forms outside of the 
Enabling Act process—even if the Committee insisted that abrogation 
“need not be seen as implicit commentary on the Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions.”76 Having laid the foundation for a critical review of the 
Forms, the Committee concluded simply that “work should begin on 
Rule 84.”77 A subcommittee was formed soon thereafter to begin review-
ing the Forms and proposing solutions. Members of the subcommittee 
                                                                                                                       
(“[A]ny hasty response in the Enabling Act process or in Congress might miss the mark. But ongo-
ing consideration is not the same as hasty action. It seems wise to maintain constant attention.”). 
 68. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Notice Pleading 
Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 69. COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009, supra note 67, at 16. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
MINUTES FOR APRIL 4–5, 2011 COMM. MEETING 32 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/Civil-Minutes-2011-04.pdf [hereinafter COMM. MIN. 
APRIL 2011]. 
 73. Id. (“The pleading forms were time-bound; they are no longer important.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 32–33 (“Revising the whole framework need not be seen as implicit commentary on 
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, but instead can be recognized for what it is—a program to shift 
the initiating responsibility for forms away from the full Enabling Act process.”). 
 77. Id. at 33. 
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surveyed judges, law firms, public interest law offices, and individual 
lawyers, and concluded that “virtually none of them use the forms.”78 
On May 2, 2014, the guillotine was prepared at last. In a report to 
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Adviso-
ry Committee recommended abrogating Rule 84 and all of the accompa-
nying forms.79 The reasons for complete abrogation were twofold: first, 
the Committee brought up the familiar argument that regular review of 
the Forms required more time than was available without diverting atten-
tion from “more important tasks”; and second, the Committee discussed 
in greater detail the “tension” between the Forms and modern pleading 
standards.80 To illustrate its second point, the Committee pointed to “Su-
preme Court decisions on the requirements of Rule 8 [specifically 
Twombly and Iqbal], and a general increase in the complexity of litiga-
tion,” among other reasons, as the source of friction with the Forms.81 
With regard to the complexity of litigation, the Committee noted that a 
single form may often not suffice with some particularly complex areas 
of law—such as patent infringement.82 
The Committee was not content to rest purely on the same argu-
ments made three years prior, and it took a swipe at opponents of abroga-
tion as well. Notwithstanding the disrespect to Civil Procedure professors 
across the nation, the Committee expressed concern that “most of the 
opposition to abrogation springs from the academic community” based 
on a “continuing unease over the direction of contemporary federal 
pleading.”83 It is hard to believe that this statement did not receive even a 
glare from Committee member Robert H. Klonoff, Dean of Lewis & 
Clark Law School and an expert in the area of civil procedure. Addition-
ally, the Committee noted the argument of some opponents that the abro-
gation proposal violated the Rules Enabling Act.84 These opponents ar-
gued that the Forms had become integral parts of the rules they illustrat-
ed, and thus, any change to the Forms necessarily required a change to 
                                                     
 78. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
AGENDA E-19 SUMMARY 93 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf. 
 79. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 412. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (“[S]ome of the uncertainty lies in determining whether a single form could be crafted 
to address the wide variety of factual circumstances that might arise with respect to any particular 
type of claim, such as patent infringement.”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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the accompanying rules as well.85 Despite these objections, the Commit-
tee urged that abrogation was still the “best course.”86 
The Standing Committee approved abrogation during its session in 
May 2014, and the Civil Rules amendments were sent for consideration 
to the Judicial Conference of the United States.87 On September 16, 
2014, the Judicial Conference approved the proposed amendments and 
forwarded them to the United States Supreme Court for review.88 The 
Court approved the amendments and forwarded them to Congress, 
which, to the shock of no one, did not intervene.89 The guillotine had 
fallen and the Forms were no more. 
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE: HONEST DIALOGUE AND TARGETED CHANGES 
The statement that the United States Supreme Court substantially 
changed the pleading requirements under the Rules outside of the Rules 
Enabling Act process is neither controversial nor excessive. Many legal 
scholars, academics, practitioners, and district court judges have openly 
acknowledged this reality.90 The problems lie, however, with the Court’s 
stubborn refusal to do the same—a position expressed by the Advisory 
Committee as well.91 Supporting this legal fiction resulted in the sacrifice 
of Rule 84 and all of the Forms, yet such a solution was unnecessary. 
Precedent already exists for amendment of both the Rules and the 
Forms in tandem. In 1993, Rule 4 was amended to include waiver of ser-
vice as an acceptable method under the Rules.92 Along with the amend-
ments to Rule 4, Forms 1A and 1B were adopted to demonstrate how the 
new summons and waiver of service of process would work in practice.93 
Additionally, in a comment by the Judicial Conference, the amendments 
to Rule 4 were noted to serve two important purposes, one of which was 
                                                     
 85. Id. For an excellent discussion of this argument in much greater detail, see Brooke D. 
Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 
NEV. L.J. 1093 (2015). 
 86. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 413. 
 87. CCL’s Nannery Attends Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, CTR. 
FOR CONST. LITIG. (June 2, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/blog/13984/. 
 88. Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package to Supreme Court, 
UNITED STATES COURTS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://news.uscourts.gov/judicial-conference-receives-
budget-update-forwards-rules-package-supreme-court. 
 89. Amendments, supra note 16. 
 90. See supra Part II. 
 91. See e.g., COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009, supra note 67; COMM. MIN. APRIL 2011, supra note 72; 
COMM. MIN. MAY 2014, supra note 15. 
 92. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
AGENDA E-19 SUMMARY 244 (1992), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1992.pdf. 
 93. Id. Forms 1A and 1B are currently named Forms 5 and 6 following the re-styling of the 
Rules in 2007. 
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to “‘codify’ the Supreme Court’s decision in Houston v. Lack.”94 In so 
doing, the Judicial Conference—and by extension, the Supreme Court—
acknowledged that the Forms were invariably tied to the rules they illus-
trate, even when a Supreme Court decision might modify those rules. 
In the context of Rule 4, the amendment process provided by the 
Rules Enabling Act functioned precisely as it was meant to. The Rules 
and Forms were updated in tandem to codify a Supreme Court decision, 
with complete transparency for public comment and Congressional re-
view.95 In stark contrast, the method of bringing the Rules in line with 
the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal was more akin to avoidance 
rather than transparency. The struggle of district courts to reconcile the 
Forms with the Court’s decisions suggests that the Forms were glaring 
examples of how the Court changed the rules outside of the Rules Ena-
bling Act process. Because the evidence was on the table, and because of 
the amount of time required to fix this mess, the Advisory Committee 
was content to simply sweep the evidence under the rug.96 
There were plenty of reasons, both as practice and as policy, for the 
Advisory Committee to avoid rule revision;97 yet, for better or for worse, 
the Rules Enabling Act process is precisely what was needed. Rather 
than abrogate the entirety of Rule 84 and the Forms, the Advisory Com-
mittee would have been better served trying to amend Forms 10 
through 21 so that they conform to the standards laid out in Twombly and 
Iqbal. Had the Advisory Committee failed to draft twelve complaints that 
lived up to the Court’s vague, imprecise standards, then the Court may 
well have rejected the proposed changes.98 Alternatively, public com-
mentary could have unleashed a hornet’s nest of frustration as to how 
unpredictable the Twombly and Iqbal standards are for plaintiffs. Regard-
less of the outcome, the insulated bubble of the Supreme Court might 
have been breached long enough for the Court to realize that Justice 
Ginsburg was right: the Court has indeed made a mess of the Rules. In 
this regard, the Rules Enabling Act process would have provided the sort 
of check on judicial interpretation that it was designed for. Instead, the 
Court may go on insisting that Iqbal and Twombly changed nothing. 
                                                     
 94. Id. at 20. 
 95. Id. at 9–11. 
 96. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 412 (“Abrogation is recommended in 
large part because this Committee has not been able to spare any significant share of its agenda for 
regular review and potential revision of the official forms . . . . A secondary consideration has been 
the tension that may be found between the forms and modern pleadings standards.”). 
 97. See generally Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1483 (2013). Professor Hoffman examines a variety of hurdles that might have dis-
suaded the rulemaking committee from revising the Forms, including the ability of the Court to 
block any proposed changes. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1552. 
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CONCLUSION 
Excising the Forms as the Court has done provided neither clarity 
to practitioners struggling to abide by the Twombly and Iqbal standards 
nor a coherent standard for judges to use in adjudicating a 12(b)(6) mo-
tions to dismiss. Perhaps more alarmingly, the death of the Forms raises 
the concern that the Court can avoid the Rules Enabling Act when chang-
ing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply by virtue of the Advisory 
Committee declaring the rules unchanged.99 Even if the Advisory Com-
mittee could not bring the Forms in line with the requirements of 
Twombly and Iqbal, there would have been significant benefit from mak-
ing the effort. 
As it stands now, the Forms have been thrown out, and the Court 
continues to insist that Twombly and Iqbal made no changes to pleading 
standards under Rule 8. The abrogation of the Forms simply emboldens 
this legal fiction. On the other hand, an attempt by the Advisory Commit-
tee to bring the Forms in line would have demonstrated the herculean 
task that practitioners in federal courts face every day. The Court would 
have been required to confront the mess it had made—especially if the 
Committee had determined that no sample complaint would suffice! Af-
ter all, if the Advisory Committee could not draft a sample complaint 
that suffices under the Court’s standard, how can we expect practitioners 
to do so? 
In the end, avoidance won the day. The task of sorting through the 
pleading conundrum now falls to the district and appellate courts, and 
plaintiffs are no closer to finding the “simplicity and brevity” that Rule 
84 once promised. 
                                                     
 99. See Coleman, supra note 85. 
